This self personality, like all other simple and immediate presentations, is indefinable ; but it is so because it is superior to definition. It can be analysed into no simpler elements, for it is itself the simplest of all; it can be made no clearer by description or comparison, for it is revealed to us in all the clearness of % original intuition " (Prolegomena Logica, p. 129). Elsewhere he says—" The self^>f consciousness is the true self." " The consciousness of personality is an ontology in the highest sense of the term " (Art. " Metaphysics " in the Encyc. Brit., pp. 618, 619). And now (in Bamp. Lect., p. 348)—"This conscious self is itself the *Ding an sick,* the standard by which all representations of personality must be judged, and from which our notion of reality, as distinguished from appearance, is originally derived." So far as our knowledge of self is concerned, this is the very doctrine which we meant to express. It is a great advance on Kant: is it not also a great advance on Sir W. Hamilton ? It is utterly inconsistent with the *phenomenal* theory of Kant: does it not modify the *relative* theory of Hamilton ?

But we profess to go a step beyond Mr. Mansel; we bold that our intuitive knowledge of body, with its primary qualities, is to be put on the same footing as our intuitive knowledge of self. Our appeal on this subject is to consciousness, which seems to attribute a like reality to both cognitions. After quoting our language—"Does not the mind in sense-perception hold the object to be a real object?" Mr. Mansel (p. 368) says—" Undoubtedly, but reality in this sense is not identical with absolute existence, unmodified by the laws of the percipient mind." We never said that we know absolute existence—that is, all about body—any more than Mr. M. would say that we know all about mind. Our doctrine is, that we know so much both of body and mind; that this knowledge, though not absolute, is positive; and that any farther knowledge that may be possessed by other beings, or by ourselves in another state of existence, would not be inconsistent with this knowledge, but merely an addition to it. We know things as they are (so far), and as presented to the cognitive mind, which is so constituted as to know the *Ding an sick*. But we do not like the language, " modified by the laws of the percipient mind;" for if we admit that the mind may modify our knowledge in one thing, why not in more, why not in all ? till we are landed in the idealism of J. Gottlob Fichte or Professor Ferrier. It is only in regard to this single point that we have ever sought to connect Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Ferrier; and we do this simply with the view of leading the disciples of the former to review and modify certain positions of their great master.

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II. Mr. Mansel has also a stricture on our view of cause and power (p. 382). We maintain that we know both self and body (as falling under our senses) as substances with power, potency, property. Mr. M. admits, that as our " knowledge of body is governed by the condition of space," so is Our " knowledge of mind by that of personality" (p. 83). In Art. on Metaph. (p. 617) he

says—"There remain two conditions which I conceive as essential to my personal conviction in every possible mode, and such as could not be removed without the destruction of myself as a conscious being. These two conditions are *time* and *free agency*" Here again we have an advance on Kant, perhaps also on Sir W. Hamilton. We rejoice to find Mr. M. making personality, including *free agency,* intuitive conditions no less than space or time. The omission by Kant of personality, as one of the intuitions given by consciousness, was one of the circumstances which allowed those who came after to run out into such a dreary waste of pantheism. We have to add, however, that we do not like the language " forms " (so abused by Fichte), or " conditions " (so abused by Ferrier), to express our intuitive convictions; we have ever regretted that Kant should have reckoned space and time as mere " forms *